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1 Introduction
Beginning with Shapley (1953), the existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibria in discounted stochastic games has remained an important problem.
Given that stochastic games with general state spaces have found applications
in various areas in economics, the issue on the existence of an equilibrium in
stationary strategies for such games has received considerable attention in the
last two decades. However, no general existence result, except for several special
classes of stochastic games, has been obtained in the literature so far.1
Nowak and Raghavan (1992) and Duffie et al. (1994) proved the existence
of correlated stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games.2 They
essentially assumed that there is a randomization device publicly known to all
players which is irrelevant to the fundamental parameters of the game. Stationary
Markov perfect equilibria have been shown to exist by Nowak (2003) and Duggan
(2012) for stochastic games with some special structures. Nowak (2003) studied a
class of stochastic games in which the transition probability has a fixed countable
set of atoms while its atomless part is a finite combination of atomless measures
that do not depend on states and actions, i.e. a mixture of constant transition
kernels. Duggan (2012) considered stochastic games with a specific product
structure, namely stochastic games with noise – which is a history-irrelevant
component of the state and could influence the payoff functions and transitions.
Recently, Levy (2013) presented a counterexample showing that a stochastic game
satisfying the usual conditions has no stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
This implies that a general existence result could only hold under some suitable
conditions.
Our main purpose is to show the existence of stationary Markov perfect equi-
libria in stochastic games under a general condition called “(decomposable) coarser
transition kernels” by establishing a new connection between the equilibrium
payoff correspondences in stochastic games and a general result on the conditional
expectations of correspondences. In a typical stochastic game with a general state
space, there could be four sources of information that are generated respectively
by the action correspondences, the stage payoffs, the transition probability itself
and the transition kernel. As long as there is enough information in the first three
sources that can not be covered by the information conveyed in the transition
kernel, one would expect the total information that comes from the four possibly
different sources to be essentially more than the information from the transition
1We shall only discuss those papers which are the closest to our results here. For detailed discussions
about the literature of stochastic games, see Duffie et al. (1994), Duggan (2012), Levy (2013), Nowak
and Raghavan (1992), and their references.
2Duffie et al. (1994) obtained additional ergodic properties under stronger conditions.
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kernel eventwise, which is exactly the condition of “coarser transition kernels”.3
When we do not have a coarser transition kernel, we can still work with the case of
a “decomposable coarser transition kernel” in the sense that the transition kernel
is decomposed as a sum of finitely many components with each component being
the product of a “coarser” transition function and a density function.4
Theorem 1 below shows that under the condition of a coarser transition kernel,
a stochastic game always has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.5 A very
simple proof of that result is provided by introducing a convexity type result of
Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) on the conditional expectation of a correspondence
to the existence problem. We point out that stochastic games with sunspot/noise
have coarser transition kernels; and thus our result covers the existence results for
such stochastic games while no product structure is imposed on the state space. We
then consider the more general case with a decomposable coarser transition kernel
and prove in Theorem 2 the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 1 extends to the case with atoms and presents an existence result
that includes that of Nowak (2003) as a special case.6 We will also illustrate the
minimality of our general condition from a technical point of view. Moreover, we
analyze a recent nonexistence example in Levy (2013) and demonstrate how this
specific game fails to satisfy our condition in Proposition 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
of discounted stochastic games. In Section 3, we propose the condition of
a (decomposable) coarser transition kernel (on the atomless part) and prove
the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in several contexts. The
minimality of this condition is also illustrated. In Section 4, we discuss the
relationship between our results and several previous existence results. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Discounted Stochastic Game
Consider an m-person discounted stochastic game:
3It is worthwhile to point out that the consideration of such information gap arises naturally in
economic models. For example, the geometric Brownian motion, which is widely used in asset pricing
models, has strictly increasing information filtrations – the information at a previous time is always
coarser than the information at a later time eventwise; see, for example, Duffie (2001, p.88). Note that
the usual sample space of a geometric Brownian motion is the space of continuous functions endowed
with the Wiener measure, which has no natural product structure.
4Such a density function is allowed to carry any information within the model. Thus, the transition
kernel itself may have the possibility of carrying the full information in the model.
5We state our result for a completely general state space that does not require a complete separable
metric structure as in some earlier work.
6Levy (2013, Example II) also includes an atom at 1 as an absorbing state.
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• I = {1, · · · ,m} is the set of players.
• (S,S) is a measurable space representing the states of nature.
• For each player i ∈ I, Xi is a nonempty compact metric space of actions
with its Borel σ-algebra B(Xi). Let X =
∏
1≤i≤mXi, and B(X) the Borel
σ-algebra on X.
• For each i ∈ I, Ai is a nonempty, S-measurable, compact valued correspon-
dence from S to Xi, Ai(s) is the set of feasible actions for player i at state s.
Let A(s) =
∏
i∈I Ai(s) for each s ∈ S.
• For each i ∈ I, ui : S ×X → R is a stage-payoff with an absolute bound C
(i.e., for all i ∈ I, (s, x) ∈ S ×X, |ui(s, x)| ≤ C for some positive number C)
such that ui(s, x) is S-measurable in s for each x ∈ X and continuous in x
for each s ∈ S.
• βi ∈ [0, 1) is player i’s discount factor.
• Q : S × X × S → [0, 1] is a transition probability representing the law of
motion for the states.
1. Q(·|s, x) (abbreviated as Q(s,x)) is a probability measure on (S,S) for all
s ∈ S and x ∈ X, and for all E ∈ S, Q(E|·, ·) is S ⊗ B(X)-measurable.
2. Q(·|s, x) is absolutely continuous with respect to λ for all s and x and
q(·|s, x) (abbreviated as q(s,x)) is the corresponding Radon-Nikodym
derivative, where λ is a countably-additive probability measure on (S,S).
3. For all s ∈ S, the mapping q(·|s, x) satisfies the following continuity
condition in x: for any sequence xn → x0,∫
S
∣∣q(s1|s, xn)− q(s1|s, x0)∣∣dλ(s1)→ 0.
The game is played in discrete time and past history is observable by all the
players. The game starts from some initial state. If s is the state at stage t and
x ∈ X is the action profile chosen simultaneously by the m players at this stage,
then Q(E|s, x) is the probability that the state at stage t+ 1 belongs to the set E
given s and x.
For a Borel set A in a complete separable metric space, M(A) is the set of all
Borel probability measures on A. A strategy of player i is a measurable mapping
fi from the past history toM(Xi) which places probability 1 on the set of feasible
actions. A stationary Markov strategy for player i is an S-measurable mapping
fi : S → M(Xi) such that fi(s) places probability 1 on the set Ai(s) for each
s ∈ S. Given a stationary Markov strategy f , the continuation values v(·, f) give
an essentially bounded S-measurable mapping from S to Rm uniquely determined
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by the following recursion
vi(s, f) =
∫
X
[
(1− βi)ui(s, x) + βi
∫
S
vi(s1, f)Q(ds1|s, x)
]
f(dx|s). (1)
The strategy profile f is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium if the
discounted expected payoff of each player i is maximized by his strategy fi in
every state s ∈ S. By standard results in dynamic programming, it means that
the continuation values v solve the following recursive maximization problem:
vi(s, f) = max
xi∈Ai(s)
∫
X−i
[
(1− βi)ui(s, xi, x−i)
+βi
∫
S
vi(s1, f)Q(ds1|s, xi, x−i)
]
f−i(dx−i|s), (2)
where x−i and X−i have the usual meanings, and f−i(s) is the product probability
⊗j 6=ifj(s) on the set of actions of all players other than i at the state s.
3 Main Results
In this section, we will show the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria
in stochastic games with a general condition called “coarser transition kernels”.
We use this condition in three different contexts. The minimality of the condition
is also demonstrated in the last subsection.
3.1 Stochastic games with coarser transition kernels
We follow the notation in Section 2; and assume that the probability measure λ
on the measurable state space (S,S) is atomless. Let G be a sub-σ-algebra of
S. For any nonnegligible set D ∈ S, let GD and SD be the respective σ-algebras
{D ∩ D′ : D′ ∈ G} and {D ∩ D′ : D′ ∈ S} on D. A set D ∈ S is said to be a
G-atom if λ(D) > 0 and given any D0 ∈ SD, there exists a set D1 ∈ GD such that
λ(D04D1) = 0. For convenience, one often considers the strong completion of G
in S, whose sets have the form E4E0 with E ∈ G and E0 a null set in S. When
G is strongly completed, D is a G-atom if and only if GD and SD are identical.
Definition 1. A discounted stochastic game is said to have a coarser transition
kernel if for some sub-σ-algebra G of S, q(·|s, x) is G-measurable for all s ∈ S and
x ∈ X, and S has no G-atom.
The sub-σ-algebra G of S can be regarded as the σ-algebra generated by the
transition kernel q(·|s, x) for all s ∈ S and x ∈ X. Let SA, Su and SQ be the
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sub-σ-algebras of S that are generated respectively by the action correspondences
Ai(·) for all i ∈ I, the stage payoffs ui(·, x) for all i ∈ I and x ∈ X, and the
transition probability Q(E|·, x) for all E ∈ S and x ∈ X.7 The sub-σ-algebras
SA, Su and SQ can be viewed as the information carried respectively by the action
correspondences, the stage payoffs and the transition probability. The σ-algebra
S, which contains SA, Su, SQ and G, represents the total information available for
strategies.8 If S has a G-atom D, then S will coincide with G (modulo null sets if
necessary) when restricted to D. Thus, the condition of coarser transition kernel
simply means that the total information available for strategies is more than the
information conveyed in the transition kernel on any non-trivial event. As long as
there is enough different information in the action correspondences, stage payoffs
and transition probability which can not be covered by the information from the
transition kernel, one would expect the total information in S that comes from
four possibly different sources to be strictly more than that in G eventwise. This
is exactly our condition.
Theorem 1. Every discounted stochastic game with a coarser transition kernel
has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Let LS1 (S,Rm) and LS∞(S,Rm) be the L1 and L∞ spaces of all S-measurable
mappings from S to Rm with the usual norm; that is,
LS1 (S,Rm) = {f : f is S-measurable and
∫
S
‖f‖ dλ <∞},
LS∞(S,Rm) = {f : f is S-measurable and essentially bounded under λ},
where ‖ · ‖ is the usual norm in Rm. By the Riesz representation theorem (see
Theorem 13.28 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)), LS∞(S,Rm) can be viewed as
the dual space of LS1 (S,Rm). Then LS∞(S,Rm) is a locally convex, Hausdorff
topological vector space under the weak∗ topology. Suppose that V is a subset of
LS∞(S,Rm) such that for any v ∈ V , ‖v‖∞ ≤ C, where C is an upper bound of the
stage payoff function u. Then V is nonempty and convex. Moreover, V is compact
under the weak∗ topology by Alaoglu’s Theorem (see Theorem 6.21 of Aliprantis
and Border (2006)).
Given any v = (v1, · · · , vm) ∈ V and s ∈ S, we consider the game Γ(v, s). The
action space for player i is Ai(s). The payoff of player i with the action profile
7Note that the information generated by the transition probability and the information generated by
the transition kernel could be different.
8That is, the strategies must be S-measurable.
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x ∈ A(s) is given by
Ui(s, x)(v) = (1− βi)ui(s, x) + βi
∫
S
vi(s1)Q(ds1|s, x). (3)
A mixed strategy for player i is an element in M(Ai(s)), and a mixed strategy
profile is an element in
⊗
i∈IM(Ai(s)). The set of mix strategy Nash equilibria
of the static game Γ(v, s), denoted by N(v, s), is a nonempty compact subset of⊗
i∈IM(Xi) under the weak∗ topology. Let P (v, s) be the set of payoff vectors
induced by the Nash equilibria in N(v, s), and co(P ) the convex hull of P . Then
co(P ) is a correspondence from V × S to Rm. Let R(v) (resp. co(R(v))) be the
set of λ-equivalence classes of S-measurable selections of P (v, ·) (resp. co(P (v, ·)))
for each v ∈ V .
By the standard argument, one can show that for each v ∈ V , P (v, ·) is S-
measurable and compact valued, and co(R(v)) is nonempty, convex, weak∗ compact
valued and upper hemicontinuous (see, for example, Lemmas 6 and 7 in Nowak and
Raghavan (1992)). Then the correspondence co(R) : V → V maps the nonempty,
convex, weak∗ compact set V (a subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological
vector space) to nonempty, convex subsets of V , and it has a closed graph in the
weak∗ topology. By the classical Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem, there is a
fixed point v′ ∈ V such that v′ ∈ co(R)(v′). That is, v′ is an S-measurable selection
of co(P (v′, ·)).
For any integrably bounded correspondence G from S to Rm, define
I(S,G)G = {E(g|G) : g is an S-measurable selection of G}.
The conditional expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure λ.
The following lemma is due to Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976, Theorem 1.2).
Lemma 1. If S has no G-atom,9 then for any S-measurable, integrably bounded,
closed valued correspondence G, I(S,G)G = I(S,G)co(G).
Proof of Theorem 1. Given v′, I(S,G)Pv′ = I
(S,G)
co(Pv′ )
by Lemma 1. There exists an S-
measurable selection v∗ of Pv′ such that E(v∗|G) = E(v′|G). For each i ∈ I, s ∈ S
and x ∈ X, we have∫
S
v∗i (s1)Q(ds1|s, x) =
∫
S
v∗i (s1)q(s1|s, x) dλ(s1) =
∫
S
E
(
v∗i q(s,x)|G) dλ
9In Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) (DE), a set D ∈ S is said to be a G-atom if λ(D) > 0 and given any
D0 ∈ SD, λ
(
s ∈ S : 0 < λ(D0 | G)(s) < λ(D | G)(s)
)
= 0. It is clear that if D is a G-atom in the sense of
(DE), thenD is a G-atom in our sense. IfD is a G-atom in the sense of (DE), fix an arbitrary setD0 ∈ SD,
let E = {s : λ(D0 | G)(s) = λ(D | G)(s)}. Then E ∈ G and λ(D0 | G) = λ(D | G)1E = λ(D ∩ E | G)
for λ-almost all s ∈ S, where 1E is the indicator function of E. It is easy to see λ(D04(D ∩ E)) = 0,
which implies that D is a G-atom in our sense.
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=∫
S
E(v∗i |G)q(s,x) dλ =
∫
S
E(v′i|G)q(s,x) dλ =
∫
S
E
(
v′iq(s,x)|G) dλ
=
∫
S
v′i(s1)q(s1|s, x) dλ =
∫
S
v′i(s1)Q(ds1|s, x).
By Equation (3), Γ(v∗, s) = Γ(v′, s) for any s ∈ S, and hence P (v∗, s) = P (v′, s).
Thus, v∗ is an S-measurable selection of Pv∗ .
By the definition of Pv∗ , these exists an S-measurable mapping f∗ from S to⊗
i∈IM(Xi) such that f∗(s) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ(v∗, s) and v∗(s) is the corresponding equilibrium payoff for each s ∈ S. It is
clear that Equations (1) and (2) hold for v∗ and f∗, which implies that f∗ is a
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
3.2 Stochastic games with decomposable coarser tran-
sition kernels
As in Subsection 3.1, we follow the notation in Section 2 and assume the probability
measure λ on the measurable state space (S,S) to be atomless. In this subsection,
we will relax the assumption in Subsection 3.1 that the transition kernel q is
measurable with respect to the sub-σ-algebra G. We will allow the transition
kernel q itself to be S-measurable, but require q to be decomposed as a sum of J
components with each component being the product of a G-measurable transition
function and an S-measurable function. A stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
still exists in such a case.
Definition 2. A discounted stochastic game is said to have a decomposable
coarser transition kernel if S has no G-atom and for some positive integer J ,
q(s1|s, x) =
∑
1≤j≤J qj(s1, s, x)ρj(s1), where qj is product measurable and qj(·, s, x)
is G-measurable for each s ∈ S and x ∈ X, qj and ρj are all nonnegative, and ρj
is integrable on the atomless probability space (S,S, λ), j = 1, . . . , J .
Note that when a discounted stochastic game has a decomposable coarser
transition kernel, the collection of mappings {q(·|s, x)}s∈S,x∈X themselves may not
be G-measurable since the ρj for 1 ≤ j ≤ J are required to be S-measurable.
Theorem 2. Every discounted stochastic game with a decomposable coarser
transition kernel has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Following the same argument and notation as in Subsection 3.1, there is
a mapping v′ ∈ V such that v′ ∈ co(R(v′)). Let H(s) = {(a, a · ρ1(s), . . . , a ·
ρJ(s)) : a ∈ Pv′(s)}, and co(H(s)) the convex hull of H(s) for each s ∈ S. It
is clear that H is S-measurable, integrably bounded and closed valued. Then
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I(S,G)H = I(S,G)co(H) by Lemma 1, which implies that there exists an S-measurable
selection v∗ of Pv′ such that E(v∗ρj |G) = E(v′ρj |G) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J . For each
i ∈ I, s ∈ S and x ∈ X, we have∫
S
v∗i (s1)Q(ds1|s, x) =
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
v∗i (s1) · qj(s1, s, x) · ρj(s1) dλ(s1)
=
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
E(v∗i ρj |G)(s1) · qj(s1, s, x) dλ(s1)
=
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
E(v′iρj |G)(s1) · qj(s1, s, x) dλ(s1)
=
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
v′i(s1) · qj(s1, s, x) · ρj(s1) dλ(s1)
=
∫
S
v′i(s1)Q(ds1|s, x).
By repeating the argument in the last paragraph of the proof for Theorem 1, we
can obtain the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
3.3 Decomposable coarser transition kernels on the
atomless part
In Theorems 1 and 2, we assume that the probability measure λ is atomless on
(S,S). Below we shall consider the more general case that λ may have atoms. To
guarantee the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, we still assume the
condition of decomposable coarser transition kernel, but now on the atomless part.
1. There exist disjoint S-measurable subsets S1 and S2 such that S1 ∪ S2 = S,
λ|S1 is the atomless part of λ while λ|S2 is the purely atomic part of λ. The
subset S2 is countable and each point in S2 is S-measurable.10
2. For s1 ∈ S1, the transition kernel q(s1|s, x) =
∑
1≤j≤J qj(s1, s, x)ρj(s1) for
some positive integer J , and for s ∈ S and x ∈ X, where qj is nonnegative
and product measurable, and ρj is nonnegative and integrable on the atomless
measure space (S1,SS1 , λS1), j = 1, . . . , J .11
Remark 1. By the continuity condition on the transition kernel, one can easily
10This assumption is only for simplicity. One can easily consider the case that S2 is a collection of at
most countably many atoms.
11It is clear that for any E ∈ S, the transition probability Q(E|s, x) = ∫
E∩S1 q(s1|s, x) dλ(s1) +∑
s2∈S2 1E(s2)q(s2|s, x)λ(s2) for any s ∈ S and x ∈ X.
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deduce that for all s ∈ S and any sequence xn → x0,∫
S1
∣∣q(s1|s, xn)− q(s1|s, x0)∣∣dλ(s1)→ 0.
∣∣q(s2|s, xn)− q(s2|s, x0)∣∣→ 0
for any s2 ∈ S2 such that λ(s2) > 0.
Definition 3. Let G be a sub-σ-algebra of SS1. A discounted stochastic game is
said to have a decomposable coarser transition kernel on the atomless part
if SS1 has no G-atom under λ and qj(·, s, x) is G-measurable on S1 for each s ∈ S
and x ∈ X, j = 1, . . . , J .
Proposition 1. Every discounted stochastic game with a decomposable coarser
transition kernel on the atomless part has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Let V1 be the set of λ-equivalence classes of S-measurable mappings from
S1 to Rm bounded by C. For each i ∈ I, let Fi be the set of all fi : S2 →M(Xi)
such that fi(s)
(
Ai(s)
)
= 1 for all s ∈ S2, F =
∏
i∈I Fi. Let V2 be the set of
mappings from S2 to Rm bounded by C; V2 is endowed with the supremum metric
and hence a complete metric space.
Given s ∈ S, v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2, consider the game Γ(v1, v2, s). The action
space for player i is Ai(s). The payoff of player i with the action profile x ∈ A(s)
is given by
Φi(s, x, v
1, v2) = (1− βi)ui(s, x) + βi
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S1
v1i (s1)qj(s1|s, x)ρj(s1) dλ(s1)
+βi
∑
s2∈S2 v
2
i (s2)q(s2|s, x)λ(s2). (4)
The set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in the game Γ(v1, v2, s) is denoted as
N(v1, v2, s). Let P (v1, v2, s) be the set of payoff vectors induced by the Nash
equilibria in N(v1, v2, s), and co(P ) the convex hull of P .
Given v1 ∈ V1, f ∈ F , define a mapping Π from V2 to V2 such that for each
i ∈ I, v2 ∈ V2 and s2 ∈ S2,
Πi(f−i, v1)(v2)(s2) = max
φi∈Fi
∫
X−i
∫
Xi
Φi(s2, xi, x−i, v1, v2)φi(dxi|s2)f−i(dx−i|s2).
(5)
Let β = max{βi : i ∈ I}. Then for any v1 ∈ V1, v2, v2 ∈ V2, x ∈ X and s ∈ S2,∣∣Φi(s, x, v1, v2)− Φi(s, x, v1, v2)∣∣ ≤ βi ∑
s2∈S2
∣∣v2i (s2)− v2i (s2)∣∣q(s2|s, x)λ(s2)
≤ βi sup
s2∈S2
∣∣v2i (s2)− v2i (s2)∣∣ ≤ β sup
s2∈S2
∣∣v2i (s2)− v2i (s2)∣∣.
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Thus, Π is a β-contraction mapping. There is a unique v¯2 ∈ V2 such that
Πi(f−i, v1)(v¯2)(s2) = v¯2i (s2) for each i ∈ I and s2 ∈ S2. Let W (v1, f) be the
set of all φ ∈ F such that for each i ∈ I and s2 ∈ S2,
v¯2i (s2) =
∫
X−i
∫
Xi
Φi(s2, xi, x−i, v1, v¯2)φi(dxi|s2)f−i(dx−i|s2). (6)
Let co(R(v1, f)) be the set of λ-equivalence classes of S-measurable selections
of co
(
P (v1, v¯2, ·)) restricted to S1, where v¯2 is generated by v1 and f as above.
Denote Ψ(v1, f) = co(R(v1, f))×W (v1, f) for each v1 ∈ V1 and f ∈ F .
By the standard argument, one can show that Ψ is convex, compact valued
and upper hemicontinuous (see, for example, Nowak (2003)). By Fan-Glicksberg’s
Fixed Point Theorem, Ψ has a fixed point (v1
′
, f2
′
) ∈ V1 × F . Let v2′ be the
mapping from S2 to Rm that is generated by v1
′
and f2
′
through the β-contraction
mapping Π as above. Then, v1
′
is an S-measurable selection of co(P (v1′ , v2′ , ·))
restricted to S1; and furthermore we have for each i ∈ I and s2 ∈ S2,
v2
′
i (s2) =
∫
X−i
∫
Xi
Φi(s2, xi, x−i, v1
′
, v2
′
)f2
′
i (dxi|s2)f2
′
−i(dx−i|s2), (7)
Πi(f
2′
−i, v
1′)(v2
′
)(s2) = v
2′
i (s2). (8)
Following the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, one can show that there
exists an S-measurable selection v1∗ of P(v1′ ,v2′ ) such that E(v1∗ρj |G) = E(v1
′
ρj |G)
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J , where the conditional expectation is taken on (S1,SS1 , λS1)
with λS1 the normalized probability measure on (S1,SS1). Hence, for any s ∈ S
and x ∈ A(s), Φi(s, x, v1′ , v2′) = Φi(s, x, v1∗, v2′), Γ(v1′ , v2′ , s) = Γ(v1∗, v2′ , s), and
therefore P (v1
′
, v2
′
, s) = P (v1∗, v2′ , s). Thus, v1∗ is an S-measurable selection of
P(v1∗,v2′ ), and there exists an S-measurable mapping f1∗ : S1 →
⊗
i∈IM(Xi) such
that f1∗(s) is a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game Γ(v1∗, v2′ , s) and v1∗(s)
the corresponding equilibrium payoff for each s ∈ S1.
Let v∗(s) be v1∗(s) for s ∈ S1 and v2′(s) for s ∈ S2. Similarly, let f∗(s) be f1∗(s)
for s ∈ S1 and f2′(s) for s ∈ S2. For s1 ∈ S1, since v1∗ is a measurable selection of
P(v1∗,v2′ ) on S1, the equilibrum property of f
1∗(s1) then implies that Equations (1)
and (2) hold for v∗ and f∗. Next, for s2 ∈ S2, the identity Φi(s2, x, v1′ , v2′) =
Φi(s2, x, v
1∗, v2′) implies that Equations (7) and (8) still hold when v1′ is replaced
by v1∗, which means that Equations (1) and (2) hold for v∗ and f∗. Therefore, f∗
is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
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3.4 Minimality of the condition
In the previous three subsections, we show the existence of stationary Markov
perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games by assuming the condition of a
(decomposable) coarser transition kernel (on the atomless part). This raises the
question of whether our condition is minimal and, if so, then in what sense.
The central difficulty in the existence argument for stochastic games is typically
due to the failure of the fixed-point method. As shown in Subsection 3.1, the
correspondence R, which is the collection of selections from the equilibrium payoff
correspondence P , will live in an infinite-dimensional space if there is a continuum
of states. Thus, the desirable closedness and upper hemicontinuity properties
would fail even though P has these properties. To handle such issues, the main
approach in the literature is to work with the convex hull co(R). We bypass this
imposed convexity restriction by using the result that I(S,G)G = I(S,G)co(G) for any S-
measurable, integrably bounded, closed valued correspondence G provided that S
has no G-atom. Moreover, for the condition of a decomposable coarser transition
kernel (on the atomless part), we assume that the transition kernel can be divided
into finitely many parts. The following propositions demonstrate the minimality
of our condition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that (S,S, λ) has a G-atom D with λ(D) > 0. Then there
exists a measurable correspondence G from (S,S, λ) to {0, 1} such that I(S,G)G 6=
I(S,G)co(G).
Proof. Define a correspondence G(s) =
{0, 1} s ∈ D;{0} s /∈ D. We claim that I(S,G)G 6=
I(S,G)co(G). Let g1(s) = 121D, where 1D is the indicator function of the set D. Then
g1 is an S-measurable selection of co(G). If there is an S-measurable selection
g2 of G such that E(g1|G) = E(g2|G), then there is a subset D2 ⊆ D such that
g2(s) = 1D2 . Since D is a G-atom, for any S-measurable subset E ⊆ D, there is a
subset E1 ∈ G such that λ(E4(E1 ∩D)) = 0. Then
λ(E ∩D2) =
∫
S
1E(s)g2(s) dλ(s) =
∫
S
E
(
1E11Dg2|G
)
dλ =
∫
S
1E1E
(
g2|G
)
dλ
=
∫
S
1E1E
(
g1|G
)
dλ =
1
2
∫
S
1E11D dλ =
1
2
λ(E1 ∩D) = 1
2
λ(E).
Thus, λ(D2) =
1
2λ(D) > 0 by choosing E = D. However, λ(D2) =
1
2λ(D2) by
choosing E = D2, which implies that λ(D2) = 0, a contradiction.
The key result that we need in the proof of Theorem 2 is I(S,G)H = I(S,G)co(H).
The question is whether a similar result holds if we generalize the condition of
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a decomposable coarser transition kernel from a finite sum to a countable sum.
We will show that this is not possible. Let (S,S, λ) be the Lebesgue unit interval
(L,B, η). Suppose that {%n}n ≥0 is a complete orthogonal system in L2(S,S, λ)
such that %n takes value in {−1, 1} and
∫
S %n dλ = 0 for each n ≥ 1 and %0 ≡ 1. Let
ρn = %n + 1 for each n ≥ 1 and ρ0 = %0. Let {En}n≥0 be a countable measurable
partition of S and qn(s) = 1En for each n ≥ 0. Suppose that a transition kernel q
is decomposed into a countable sum q(s1|s, x) =
∑
n≥0 qn(s)ρn(s1). The following
proposition shows that the argument for the case that J is finite is not valid for
such an extension.12
Proposition 3. There exists a correspondence G and a selection f of co(G) such
that for any σ-algebra G ⊆ S, there is no selection g of G with E(gρn|G) =
E(fρn|G) for any n ≥ 0.
Proof. Let G(s) = {−1, 1} and f(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. Then f is a selection of
co(G). We claim that there does not exist an S-measurable selection g of G such
that E(gρn|G) = E(fρn|G) for any n ≥ 0.
We show this by way of contradiction. Suppose that there exists an S-
measurable selection g of G such that E(gρn|G) = 0 for any n ≥ 0. Then
there exists a set E ∈ S such that g(s) =
1 s ∈ E;−1 s /∈ E. Thus, λ(E) − λ(Ec) =∫
S gρ0 dλ =
∫
S E(gρ0|G) dλ = 0, which implies λ(E) = 12 . Moreover,
∫
S g%n dλ =∫
S gρn dλ−
∫
S g dλ =
∫
S E(gρn|G) dλ−0 = 0 for each n ≥ 1, which contradicts the
condition that {%n}n≥0 is a complete orthogonal system.
Thus, our condition is minimal in the sense that, if one would like to adopt the
measure-theoretical approach as used here to obtain a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium, then it is the most general condition.
4 Discussion
In this section, we shall discuss the relationship between our results and several
related results.13
Correlated equilibria
It is proved in Nowak and Raghavan (1992) that a correlated stationary Markov
perfect equilibrium exists in discounted stochastic games in the setup described in
12It is a variant of a well known example of Lyapunov.
13As mentioned in Footnote 1 in the introduction, we only consider those results that are most relevant
to ours.
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our Section 2. Duffie et al. (1994) obtained ergodic properties of such correlated
equilibria under stronger conditions. They essentially assumed that players can
observe the outcome of a public randomization device before making decisions at
each stage.14 Thus, the new state space can be regarded as S′ = S × L endowed
with the product σ-algebra S ′ = S ⊗ B and product measure λ′ = λ⊗ η, where L
is the unit interval endowed with the Borel σ-algebra B and Lebesgue measure η.
Denote G′ = S ⊗ {∅, L}. Given s′, s′1 ∈ S′ and x ∈ X, the new transition kernel
q′(s′1|s′, x) = q(s1|s, x), where s (resp. s1) is the projection of s′ (resp. s′1) on S
and q is the original transition kernel with the state space S. Thus, q′(·|s′, x) is
measurable with respect to G′ for any s′ ∈ S′ and x ∈ X. It is obvious that S ′
has no G′-atom. Then the condition of coarser transition kernel is satisfied for the
extended state space (S′,S ′, λ′), and the existence of a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium follows from Theorem 1. The drawback of this approach is that the
“sunspot” is irrelevant irrelevant to the fundamental parameters of the game. Our
result shows that it can indeed enter the stage payoff u, the correspondence of
feasible actions A and the transition probability Q.
Decomposable constant transition kernels on the atomless part
Nowak (2003) considered stochastic games with transition probabilities as
combinations of finitely many measures on the atomless part. In particular, the
structure of the transition probability in Nowak (2003) is as follows.
1. S2 is a countable subset of S and S1 = S\S2, each point in S2 is S-measurable.
2. There are atomless nonnegative measures µj concentrated on S1, nonnegative
measures δk concentrated on S2, and measurable functions qj , bk : S ×
X → [0, 1], 1 ≤ j ≤ J and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, where J and K are positive
integers. The transition probability Q(·|s, x) = δ(·|s, x) + Q′(·|s, x) for each
s ∈ S and x ∈ X, where δ(·|s, x) = ∑1≤k≤K bk(s, x)δk(·) and Q′(·|s, x) =∑
1≤j≤J qj(s, x)µj(·).
3. For any j and k, qj(s, ·) and bk(s, ·) are continuous on X for any s ∈ S.
We shall show that any stochastic game with the above structure satisfies the
condition of decomposable coarser transition kernel on the atomless part.
Without loss of generality, assume that µj and δk are all probability measures.
Let λ(E) = 1J+K
(∑
1≤j≤J µj(E) +
∑
1≤k≤K δk(E)
)
for any E ∈ S. Then µj is
absolutely continuous with respect to λ and assume that ρj is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative for 1 ≤ j ≤ J .
14For detailed discussions on such a public randomization device, or “sunspot”, see Duffie et al. (1994)
and their references.
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Given any s ∈ S and x ∈ X, let
q(s′|s, x) =

∑
1≤j≤J qj(s, x)ρj(s
′), if s′ ∈ S1;
δ(s′|s,x)
λ(s′) , if s
′ ∈ S2 and λ(s′) > 0;
0, if s′ ∈ S2 and λ(s′) = 0.
Then Q(·|s, x) is absolutely continuous with respect to λ and q(·|s, x) is the
transition kernel. It is obvious that the condition of a decomposable coarser
transition kernel on the atomless part is satisfied with G = {∅, S1}. Then a
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium exists by Proposition 1.
Noisy stochastic games
Duggan (2012) proved the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria
in stochastic games with noise – a component of the state that is nonatomically
distributed and not directly affected by the previous period’s state and actions. The
exogenously given product structure of the state space as considered by Duggan
(2012) is defined as follows:
1. The set of states can be decomposed as S = H×R and S = H⊗R, where H
and R are complete, separable metric spaces, and H and R are the respective
Borel σ-algebras. Qh(·|s, a) denotes the marginal of Q(·|s, a) on h ∈ H.
2. There is a fixed probability measure κ on (H,H) such that for all s and
a, Qh(·|s, a) is absolutely continuous with respect to κ and α(·|s, a) is the
Radon-Nikodym derivative.
3. For all s, the mapping a → Qh(·|s, a) is norm continuous; that is, for all s,
all a and each sequence {am} of action profiles converging to a, the sequence
{Qh(·|s, am)} converges to Qh(·|s, a) in total variation.
4. Conditional on next period’s h′, the distribution of r′ in next period is
independent of the current state and actions. In particular, Qr : H × R →
[0, 1] is a transition probability such that for all s, all a, and all Z ∈ S, we
have Q(Z|s, a) = ∫H ∫R 1Z(h′, r′)Qr(dr′|h′)Qh(dh′|s, a).
5. For κ-almost all h, Qr(·|h) (abbreviated as νh) is absolutely continuous with
respect to an atomless probability measure ν on (R,R), and β(·|h) is the
Radon-Nikodym derivative.
In the following we show that the condition of a coarser transition kernel is
satisfied in noisy stochastic games.
Proposition 4. Every noisy stochastic game has a coarser transition kernel.
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Proof. Let λ(Z) =
∫
H
∫
R 1Z(h, r)β(r|h) dν(r) dκ(h) for all Z ∈ S. Let G = H ⊗
{∅, R}. It is clear that α(·|s, a) is G-measurable, we need to show that S has no
G-atom under λ.
Fix any Borel D ⊆ S with λ(D) > 0. Then there is a measurable mapping
φ from (D,SD) to (L,B) such that φ can generate the σ-algebra SD, where L is
the unit interval endowed with the Borel σ-algebra B. Let g(h, r) = h for each
(h, r) ∈ D, Dh = {r : (h, r) ∈ D} and HD = {h ∈ H : νh(Dh) > 0}.
Denote gh(·) = g(h, ·) and φh(·) = φ(h, ·) for each h ∈ HD. Define a mapping
f : HD × L → [0, 1] as follow: f(h, l) = νh
(
φ−1h ([0,l])
)
νh(Dh)
. Similarly, denote fh(·) =
f(h, ·) for each h ∈ HD. For κ-almost all h ∈ HD, the atomlessness of νh implies
νh ◦ φ−1h ({l}) = 0 for all l ∈ L. Thus the distribution function fh(·) is continuous
on L for κ-almost all h ∈ HD.
Let γ(s) = f(g(s), φ(s)) for each s ∈ D, and D0 = γ−1([0, 12 ]), which is a subset
of D. For h ∈ HD, let lh be max{l ∈ L : fh(l) ≤ 12} if fh is continuous, and 0
otherwise. It is clear that when fh is continuous, fh(lh) = 1/2. For any E ∈ H, let
D1 = (E ×R) ∩D, and E1 = E ∩HD. If λ(D1) = 0, then
λ(D0 \D1) = λ(D0) =
∫
HD
νh ◦ φ−1h ◦ f−1h
(
[0,
1
2
]
)
dκ(h)
=
∫
HD
νh
(
φ−1h ([0, lh])
)
dκ(h) =
∫
HD
f(h, lh)νh(Dh) dκ(h)
=
1
2
∫
HD
νh(Dh) dκ(h) =
1
2
λ(D) > 0.
If λ(D1) > 0, then
λ(D1 \D0) =
∫
E1
∫
R
1D\D0(h, r) dνh(r) dκ(h) =
∫
E1
νh ◦ φ−1h ◦ f−1h
(
(
1
2
, 1]
)
dκ(h)
=
∫
E1
νh ◦ φ−1h ◦ f−1h
(
[0, 1] \ [0, 1
2
]
)
dκ(h) =
1
2
∫
E1
νh(Dh) dκ(h) =
1
2
λ(D1) > 0.
Hence, D is not a G-atom. Therefore, S has no G-atom and the condition of coarser
transition kernel is satisfied.
By Proposition 4, the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in noisy
stochastic games follows from Theorem 1 directly.
Theorem 3 (Duggan (2012)). Every noisy stochastic game possesses a stationary
Markov perfect equilibrium.
Nonexistence of stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
Levy (2013, Example II) presented a concrete example of a stochastic game
satisfying all the conditions as stated in Section 2 which has no stationary Markov
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perfect equilibrium. The player space is {A,B,C,D, θ1, . . . , θM}, where M is a
positive integer. Players A and B have the action space {L,M,R}, each player θj
has the action space {L,R}, players C and D have the action space {1,−1}. The
state space is S = [0, 1] endowed with the Borel σ-algebra B.
The transitions Q(·|s, x) in this example is given by Q(s, x) = (1−α(1−s))δ1+(
α(1 − s))Q′(s, x), where α is a constant in (0, 1] and the probability Q′(·|s, x) is
given by Table 1:
Player C
Player D
−1 1
−1 U(s, 1) 1
2
U(s, 1) + 1
2
δ1
1 1
2
U(s, 1) + 1
2
δ1 δ1
Table 1
where δ1 is the Dirac measure at 1, and U(s, 1) is the uniform distribution on [s, 1]
for s ∈ [0, 1).
The following proposition shows that the condition of a decomposable coarser
transition kernel on the atomless part is violated in this example.15
Proposition 5. The atomless part
(
α(1− s))Q′(s, x) of the transition probability
in Levy’s Example does not have a decomposable coarser transition kernel.
Proof. Given the state s ∈ [0, 1) and action profile x in the previous stage, suppose
that players C and D both play the strategy −1, the transition probability in the
current stage is Q(s, x) =
(
1 − α(1 − s))δ1 + α(1 − s)U(s, 1). It is clear that
U(s, 1) is absolute continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure η with the
Radon-Nikodym derivative
q(s1|s) =
 11−s s1 ∈ [s, 1],0 s1 ∈ [0, s).
Suppose that the atomless part
(
α(1− s))Q′(s, x) has a decomposable coarser
transition kernel; so does U(s, 1). Then, for some positive integer J , we have
q(·|s) = ∑1≤j≤J qj(·, s)ρj(·) for any s ∈ [0, 1), where qj is nonnegative and product
measurable, ρj is nonnegative and integrable. Let G be the minimal σ-algebra (with
strong completion) with respect to which qj(·, s) is measurable for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J
and s ∈ [0, 1). The condition of a decomposable coarser transition kernel implies
that B has no G-atom; we shall show otherwise and thus derive a contradiction.
15Proposition 5 can also be implied by the nonexistence result in Levy (2013) and our Proposition 1.
However, the argument in Levy (2013) is deep and difficult, while our proof explicitly demonstrates why
his example fails to satisfy our sufficient condition in Proposition 1.
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Denote Dj = {s1 ∈ S : ρj(s1) = 0} for 1 ≤ j ≤ J . Since q(s1|0) = 1 for all
s1 ∈ S, we must have ∩1≤j≤JDj = ∅, and hence η
( ∩1≤j≤J Dj) = 0.
First suppose that η(Dj) = 0 for all j. Let D¯ = ∪1≤j≤JDj ; then η(D¯) = 0.
Fix s′ ∈ [0, 1). Let Ej = {s1 ∈ S : qj(s1, s′) = 0} and E0 = ∩1≤j≤JEj . Then
Ej ∈ G for 1 ≤ j ≤ J , and hence E0 ∈ G. For any s1 ∈ [s′, 1], since q(s1|s′) > 0,
there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ J such that qj(s1|s′) > 0, which means that s1 /∈ Ej and
s1 /∈ E0. Hence, E0 ⊆ [0, s′). For any s1 ∈
(
[0, s′) \ D¯), we have q(s1|s′) = 0, and
ρj(s1) > 0 for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J , which implies that qj(s1|s′) = 0 for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J ,
and s1 ∈ E0. That is,
(
[0, s′) \ D¯) ⊆ E0. Hence, η(E04[0, s′]) = 0. Therefore,
[0, s′] ∈ G for all s′ ∈ [0, 1), which implies that G coincides with B and B has a
G-atom [0, 1). This is a contradiction.
Next suppose that η(Dj) = 0 does not hold for all j. Then there exists a set,
say D1, such that η(D1) > 0. Let Z = {K ⊆ {1, . . . , J} : 1 ∈ K, η(DK) > 0},
where DK = ∩j∈KDj . Hence, {1} ∈ Z, Z is finite and nonempty. Let K0 be the
element in Z containing most integers; that is,
∣∣K0∣∣ ≥ ∣∣K∣∣ for any K ∈ Z, where∣∣K∣∣ is the cardinality of K. Let Kc0 = {1, . . . , J}\K0. Then Kc0 is not empty since
η
( ∩1≤j≤J Dj) = 0. In addition, η(DK0 ∩ Dj) = 0 for any j ∈ Kc0. Otherwise,
η
(
DK0 ∩ Dj
)
> 0 for some j ∈ Kc0 and hence (K0 ∪ {j}) ∈ Z, which contradicts
the choice of K0. Let Dˆ = ∪k∈Kc0
(
DK0 ∩Dk
)
; then η(Dˆ) = 0. For all s1 ∈ DK0 ,
q(s1|s) =
∑
k∈Kc0 qk(s1, s)ρk(s1) for all s ∈ [0, 1).
Fix s′ ∈ [0, 1). Let Ek = {s1 ∈ S : qk(s1, s′) = 0} and EKc0 = ∩k∈Kc0Ek. Then
Ek ∈ G for any k and hence EKc0 ∈ G. For any s1 ∈ [s′, 1], since q(s1|s′) > 0,
there exists k ∈ Kc0 such that qk(s1|s′) > 0, which means that s1 /∈ Ek and
s1 /∈ EKc0 . Hence, EKc0 ⊆ [0, s′), and EKc0 ∩ DK0 ⊆ [0, s′) ∩ DK0 . Now, for
any s1 ∈
((
[0, s′) ∩DK0) \ Dˆ), we have q(s1|s′) = 0, and ρk(s1) > 0 for each
k ∈ Kc0, which implies that qk(s1|s′) = 0 for each k ∈ Kc0, and s1 ∈ EKc0 . That is,((
[0, s′) ∩DK0) \ Dˆ) ⊆ EKc0 ∩DK0 . Hence, ([0, s′]∩DK0)\ (EKc0 ∩DK0) ⊆ Dˆ, and
η
(
(EKc0 ∩DK0)4([0, s′] ∩DK0)
)
= 0. Thus, B has a G-atom DK0 . This is again a
contradiction.
5 Concluding Remarks
We consider stationary Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
with a general state space. So far, only several special classes of stochastic
games have been shown to possess equilibria, while the existence of such equilibria
under some general condition has been an open problem. In the literature, the
standard approach for the existence arguments is to work with the convex hull
of the collection of all selections from the equilibrium payoff correspondence. We
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adopt this approach and provide a very simple proof of some existence results
under the general condition of a (decomposable) coarser transition kernel. The
minimality of our condition is illustrated. As shown in Section 4, our results
strictly generalize various previous existence results and provide some explanation
why a recent counterexample fails to have an equilibrium in stationary strategies
as well.
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